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Abstract
The non-associative account of phobic etiology assumes that a number of specific fears (e.g., fear of
heights, water, spiders, strangers, and separation) have an evolutionary background and may occur in the
absence of learning experiences (e.g., conditioning). By this view, these specific fears pertain to stimuli
that once posed a challenge to the survival of our prehistoric ancestors. Accordingly, they would emerge
spontaneously during the course of normal development and only in a minority of individuals, these specific
fears would persist into adulthood. While the non-associative approach has generated interesting findings,
several critical points can be raised. First, it capitalizes on negative findings, i.e., the failure to document
learning experiences (e.g., conditioning, modeling) in the history of phobic children. Second, it largely
ignores factors that have been found to be crucial for the acquisition of early childhood fears (e.g., the
developmental level of the child, stimulus characteristics such as novelty, aversiveness, and unpredictability,
and early experience with uncontrollable events). As an alternative to the non-associative account, we
briefly describe a multifactorial model of childhood fears and phobias.  2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All
rights reserved.
Keywords: Fears and phobias; Children; Etiology, Non-associative account
1. Introduction
Specific fears are common in childhood (see e.g., King, Hamilton, & Ollendick, 1988), yet
most of them are short-lived and dissipate within months (Bauer, 1976; Ferrari, 1986). However,
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in some children, specific fears persist and become invalidating in the sense that they interfere
with normal functioning. In these cases, a diagnosis of specific phobia should be considered
(see Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fourth edition [DSM-IV]; American
Psychiatric Association [APA], 1994).
While researchers have reached a considerable degree of consensus about the assessment and
treatment of childhood specific phobias (King, Ollendick, & Murphy, 1997; Ollendick & King,
1998), their etiology remains a matter of some debate. Some researchers maintain that fears and
phobias predominantly arise as a consequence of learning experiences. Others assume that these
phenomena reflect innate, spontaneous reactions to evolutionary prepotent cues (see for a review,
Merckelbach & De Jong, 1996). The non-associative account of phobic etiology is a typical
exponent of the latter position. It assumes that fear of heights, water, spiders, strangers, separation,
and so on represent evolutionary-relevant fears that occur without critical learning experiences
involving these feared objects (Menzies & Clarke, 1995; Poulton & Menzies, 2002).
To be sure, the non-associative view has generated a vast amount of interesting findings that
will inform the research domain of anxiety disorders. Nevertheless, some critical points can be
raised. In the first section of our commentary, we will critically discuss the evidence for the non-
associative account. We will argue that there are a number of alternative explanations for the
emergence of childhood fears that deserve scientific evaluation before assuming that these fears
are innate. In the second section, we will describe a model of childhood fears which integrates
empirical material that has accumulated over the past years. In our opinion, this model provides
a more useful starting point for further research than does the non-associative approach.
2. Commentary on the non-associative account
2.1. The three pathways to fear and the non-associative account
Rachman’s (1977) influential three-pathways theory suggests that three types of discrete learn-
ing experiences play a role in the acquisition of childhood fears and phobias: (1) aversive classical
conditioning, (2) modeling, and (3) negative information transmission. Retrospective research
relying on child and parent report found empirical evidence suggesting that these learning experi-
ences are, indeed, involved in the etiology of childhood fears and phobias (see for reviews, King,
Gullone, & Ollendick, 1998; Merckelbach, De Jong, Muris, & Van den Hout, 1996; Muris &
Merckelbach, 2001). Contrary to Rachman’s theory, however, there are a number of fears, such
as fear of water (King et al., 1998), for which no conditioning, modeling, or information pathways
can be found in a substantial proportion of children. Apparantly, these fears occur without evident
learning experiences, an observation that serves as the starting point for the non-associative
account.
The main premise of the non-associative account is that these fears are evolutionary-relevant.
According to Menzies and Clarke (1995), they pertain to stimuli that once posed a challenge to
the survival of our prehistoric ancestors. Accordingly, fear responses would occur spontaneously
during the course of normal development.
In our view, the non-associative account of childhood fears suffers from several shortcomings.
To begin with, its advocates (e.g., Poulton & Menzies, 2002) claim that some fears (e.g., fear of
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water) consist of evolutionary-relevant and, therefore, non-associative responses, while other fears
(e.g., driving fears) are evolutionary-neutral responses that require associative learning. But how
do they know? One could easily formulate a plausible evolutionary scenario for, say, driving
fears. Consider, as another example, fear of insects. At first sight, this fear appears to be a proto-
typical case of an evolutionary-relevant fear. Meanwhile, historians remind us of the fact that it
was only after the discovery around 1900 of the insect role in disease transmission that people’s
attitude towards insects changed dramatically. In the words of Riley (1986; p. 844): “These dis-
coveries, communicated to health authorities and concerned lay people often in lurid cries about
the dangers of arthropod vectors, evidently provoked a sudden change in attitudes toward certain
insects, especially the common fly. Whereas people had previously shown an attitude of friendly
tolerance to insects, specialists suddenly advised treating them as dangerous pests”. The fear
inducing power of negative information is also nicely illustrated by the recent work of Field and
colleagues (Field, Argyris, & Knowles, in press). These authors showed that providing children
with negative information about fictitious animals is enough to elicit fear beliefs about these
creatures. Findings such as these are largely ignored by the non-associative account.
A second point concerns the genetic implications of the non-associative view. The assumption
that a significant number of important specific phobias reflect innate response tendencies implies,
almost by definition, that there should be a substantial genetic contribution to the category of
specific phobias. However, that is not what behavioural-genetic studies have generally found. For
example, Kendler, Neale, Kessler, Heath, and Eaves (1992) concluded from their twin data that
relative to other anxiety disorders, specific phobias have the lowest heritabilities, but the highest
specific environmental influences. This led the authors to conclude “that in the simple phobias,
pathogenic environmental experiences are usually highly specific (e.g., being locked in a dark
closet, bitten by a snake, nearly falling out of a window)” (Kendler et al., 1992; p. 280). This
conclusion is, of course, difficult to reconcile with the non-associative view.
A third point has to do with the way in which advocates of the non-associative view treat the
data that were obtained with the various versions of the Phobic Origin Questionnaire (POQ). The
POQ intends to gather information about the learning history of phobic patients. Poulton and
Menzies (this issue) are quite right when they point out that retrospective self-report instruments
like the POQ are subject to all kinds of limitations. Yet, these limitations do no justify Poulton
and Menzies’ cavalier-like ignorance of all POQ studies. For one thing, by focussing on children’s
onset experiences and their verification through parental reports, the methodology of some more
recent POQ studies has been vastly improved. These studies show that a significant number of
spider and dog phobic children report associative onset experiences that are confirmed by their
parents (e.g., Kheriaty, Kleinknecht, & Hyman, 1999; Merckelbach, Muris, & Schouten, 1996;
Merckelbach & Muris, 1997; Muris, Merckelbach, & Collaris, 1997). Together with laboratory
research on learning processes involved in fear (e.g., Malloy & Lewis, 1988; Forsyth and Eifert,
1996), these findings suggest that Rachman’s (1991) three-pathways-to-fear model still is a good
starting point for understanding the etiology of phobias. Again, this conclusion does not accord
with the non-associative view.
Our fourth and final point concerns the empirical basis of the non-assocative view. In our
opinion, its empirical basis is meagre because it largely consists of the observation that Rachman’s
three pathways to fear do not occur in the history of some fearful or phobic children. Here, the
non-associative view runs the risk of becoming tautological: if you find that phobic subjects fail
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to report associative onset experiences you may call their fear evolutionary-relevant. At the same
time, evolutionary relevance is derived from the fact that subjects cannot recall onset experiences.
2.2. Development and predictability as determinants of early fears
As to the development of early childhood fears, it is a well-documented fact that they only
appear after children have reached a certain maturational stage (see Marks, 1987). For example,
experimental research employing the so-called visual cliff procedure has shown that fear of heights
critically depends on children’s locomotor development (Bertenthal, Campos, & Barrett, 1984).
Similarly, fear of separation only occurs after children have developed object permanence for
faces (Kagan, Kearsley, & Zelazo, 1975). When trying to understand why these developmental
changes are associated with fear, one has to keep in mind young children’s situation. They are
constantly exposed to new stimuli and situations, yet they have little experience, physical strength,
and coordination.
The question is why most new stimuli only elicit a brief orientation reaction, whereas some
(e.g., heights, separation) provoke fear. Gray’s (1982; see Gray & McNaughton, 1996) theory is
relevant in this respect. According to Gray, fear can best be viewed as the output of a subcortical
circuit dubbed the Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS). In order to predict events, the BIS con-
stantly compares new information from the outside world to what is already stored in memory.
As soon as the individual is confronted with aversive, novel, and/or unpredictable stimuli, the
BIS is activated and fear arises. It is assumed that stimuli that are characterized by higher levels
of aversiveness, novelty, and/or unpredictability will elicit greater BIS activity, and hence higher
levels of fear. There are also good reasons to believe that there are temperamental differences
between people in BIS functioning.
2.3. The role of control in the early environment
While it is plausible that Rachman’s three pathways contribute to fear acquisition in children
of all ages (King et al., 1998), other types of learning experiences may also be relevant. Germane
to this issue is the work by Chorpita and Barlow (1998). These authors suggest that early experi-
ences with uncontrollable events may be thought of as a primary pathway to the development of
fear and anxiety in that such experiences may foster an increased likelihood to process events as
not within one’s control (i.e., a psychological vulnerability). Children reared with an increased
sense of control have relatively greater access to information that predicts the possibility of avoid-
ing negative consequences. Conversely, children experiencing diminished control over events dur-
ing development have predominantly stored information predicting that nothing can be done to
prevent negative outcome.
2.4. Conclusion
The non-associative account capitalizes on the observation that learning experiences such as
conditioning, modeling, and/or negative information do not occur in the history of some fearful
or phobic children. In the final analysis, this account lacks subtlety in that it ignores a number
of factors that seem to be crucial for the acquisition of early childhood fears, viz. developmental
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transitions of children, stimulus characteristics such as novelty, aversiveness, and unpredictability,
and early experiences with uncontrollable events.
3. An alternative framework: the multifactorial model
We recently described a framework that is better able to structure current knowledge on the
etiology of childhood specific phobias than the non-associative account (Muris & Merckelbach,
2001). Briefly, our multifactorial framework rests on the following observations: (1) The majority
of children display normal developmental fears that decrease with the passage of time; (2) A
minority of the children have a genetic vulnerability factor that predisposes them to develop
maladaptive fears; (3) This genetic vulnerability manifests itself in certain behavioural patterns; (4)
Environmental factors interact with normal developmental fears and genetically linked behavioural
patterns to produce extremely persistent fears that culminate in specific phobias; and (5) Once a
specific phobia exists, it is maintained by cognitive biases. Below, we will briefly address each
of these points.
3.1. Normal developmental fears
Research has shown that mild fears are fairly common among children (see for a review,
Craske, 1997) and follow a predictable course: in infancy, children become fearful of stimuli in
their immediate environment, but as the child matures these fears begin to incorporate anticipatory
events and stimuli of an imaginary or abstract nature (Gullone, 2000). It is assumed that this
developmental pattern of fears reflects everyday experiences and is to an important extent
mediated by children’s cognitive capacities (Marks, 1987). Thus, these fears should be viewed
as normal phenomena.
3.2. Genetics
Behavioural-genetic studies indicate that genetic transmission contributes to the etiology of
specific fears and phobias. Stevenson, Batten, and Cherner (1992) compared the frequency of
self-reported fears in monozygotic and dizygotic twin pairs with ages ranging between 8 and 16
years. The authors found that a twin’s level of fearfulness could be predicted from the co-twin’s
score. Furthermore, the frequency of fear was more similar in monozygotic than in dizygotic twin
pairs. Finally, whereas heritability was significant for general fearfulness, examination of specific
fear factors revealed that only some fears had a significant heritability (e.g., fears of small
animals).
In a recent review of behavioural-genetic studies, Taylor (1998) distinguished two types of
genetic influences that may contribute to phobic etiology: a general genetic factor would act as
a vulnerability factor to a wide range of phobic fears, whereas specific genetic factors would only
predispose to certain types of fears.
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3.2.1. Behavioural inhibition.
Taylor (1998) points out that the general genetic component may constitute the biological sub-
strate of what is normally referred to as trait anxiety, neuroticism, or negative affectivity. One
obvious behavioural approximation of this general trait is behavioural inhibition. Behavioural
inhibition refers to the tendency of some children to interrupt ongoing behaviour and to react
with distress and withdrawal when confronted with unfamiliar people or situations. Behavioural
inhibition is thought to be a stable and inherited response disposition that characterizes approxi-
mately 10 to 15% of the children (e.g., Kagan, Reznick, Clarke, Snidman, & Garcia-Coll, 1984).
Cross-sectional and longitudinal studies conducted by Biederman and colleagues (1990, 1993)
strongly suggest that this disposition serves as a risk factor for anxiety disorders. These studies
showed that preschool children identified as behavioural inhibited are more likely to have anxiety
disorders including specific phobias compared to control children. This became even more promi-
nent at a 3-year follow-up: in the cohort of children who were initially identified as behaviourally
inhibited, the rates of specific phobias and other anxiety disorders had increased markedly. Thus,
behavioural inhibition seems to be a vulnerability factor for a broad range of anxiety disorders,
among which specific phobias (see for a review, Biederman, Rosenbaum, Chaloff, & Kagan,
1995).
3.2.2. Disgust sensitivity.
Disgust sensitivity is considered to be a personality trait that can be reliably measured with
self-report scales that contains items such as “It bothers me to see someone in a restaurant eating
messy food with his fingers” (Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994). There is now good evidence to
suggest that disgust sensitivity is involved in the etiology of specific fears and phobias (see Muris,
Merckelbach, Schmidt, & Tierney, 1999), in particular certain types of animal phobias (De Jong &
Muris, in press). For example, De Jong, Andrea, and Muris (1997) assessed fear of spiders, disgust
sensitivity, and spider’s disgust-evoking status in spider phobic children who applied for treatment,
in non-phobic children, and in the parents of both groups of children. Phobic children were tested
before and after behavioural treatment. The findings demonstrated that disgust is an important
feature of spider phobia. Compared to control children, spider phobic children exhibited higher
levels of disgust sensitivity and considered spiders per se as more disgusting. Furthermore, after
treatment, reduction in spider fear was parallelled by a steep decline in spiders’ disgust-evoking
status. Finally, mothers of spider phobic children attributed a high disgust-evoking status to spid-
ers. Although modeling experiences may also be involved, one could interpret the latter finding
as support for a genetic factor that is involved in the familial transmission of disgust sensitivity
and, in its wake, animal phobia. Thus, following Taylor’s (1998) taxonomy, disgust sensivity can
be conceptualized as a specific genetic factor.
3.3. Environmental influences
Twin studies indicate that genetic factors play a significant, but modest role in the etiology of
specific phobias (e.g., Kendler et al., 1992). Apparently, then, environmental factors determine
whether genetically transmitted vulnerabilities culminate in specific phobias. Apart from discrete
learning experiences (e.g., conditioning, modeling, negative information, and experiences of
uncontrollability), a number of general environmental factors contribute to specific childhood
phobias. Negative life events and parental rearing styles constitute such general factors.
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Several studies have found an increased incidence of negative life events such as parental
divorce or death of significant family members in clinically anxious children (e.g., Kashani et al.,
1990). However, it is unlikely that these life events per se are responsible for the emergence of
specific phobias or other anxiety disorders. Spence and Dadds (1996) argue that the negative
impact of aversive life events critically depends on factors that exacerbate (e.g., behavioural
inhibition) or buffer (e.g., social support or effective coping style) their effects.
Parental rearing styles may also promote the development of high fear and anxiety levels.
Evidence for this comes from studies that relied on direct observation of current parent-child
interactions. Following such an approach, Dadds, Barrett, and Rapee (1996) noted that parents of
anxious children often encourage their children to adopt avoidant coping strategies. Similarly, a
study by Muris, Steerneman, Merckelbach, and Meesters (1996) demonstrated that specific fears
reported by children are a function of the extent to which their mothers express their own fears
in the presence of the children. Furthermore, studies employing questionnaires that measure chil-
dren’s perceptions of parental rearing behaviours suggest that anxious rearing, parental control,
and rejection all account for a small, but nontrivial proportion of children’s fear and anxiety
symptoms (Muris & Merckelbach, 1998; Gru¨ner, Muris, & Merckelbach, 1999).
3.4. Cognitive biases
The influential two-stage model of Mowrer (1960) suggests that avoidance behaviour is respon-
sible for the maintenance of phobic fear. More precisely, avoidance would minimize direct and
prolongued contact with the fear-provoking stimulus, and, hence, the phobic child would not have
the opportunity to learn that it is in fact harmless. While the role of avoidance behaviour in the
maintenance of phobias seems self-evident, there are also a number of cognitive biases that pro-
mote continuation of phobic fear.
3.4.1. Attentional bias.
A large number of studies have documented that phobics display hyperattention toward poten-
tially threatening material. A frequently employed technique for demonstrating this so-called atten-
tional bias is the emotional Stroop task. In this task, subjects are required to name the colour in
which words are printed while ignoring the meaning of these words. A consistent finding in Stroop
studies with, for example, spider phobics is that their colour naming of threatening words (e.g.,
web) is slower than that of neutral words (e.g., car). This would be due to the fact that phobics
automatically direct their attention to the content of the threatening words, which in turn interferes
with their main task, i.e., colour naming (Watts, McKenna, Sharrock, & Trezise, 1986). There is
some evidence that attentional bias also occurs in fearful children. For example, in their Stroop
experiment, Martin, Horder, and Jones (1992) found that spider fearful children exhibit retarded
colour naming latencies when confronted with phobic words. Similarly, using a dot-probe para-
digm, Vasey and colleagues (Vasey, Daleiden, Williams, & Brown, 1995; Vasey, El-Hag, &
Daleiden, 1996) showed that clinically anxious children and children high in test anxiety are faster
to react to a probe if it is preceded by a threatening rather than a neutral word. This differential
reaction was not evident for the control children in the Vasey et al. studies and, therefore, is
suggestive of heightened selective attention towards threatening stimuli.
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3.4.2. Covariation bias.
The experimental demonstration of covariation bias in phobias is straigthforward. Phobic and
normal subjects are shown a series of slides consisting fear-relevant (e.g., spiders) and neutral
(e.g., flowers) pictures. Slide offset is followed by one of three outcomes, namely an aversive
shock, a tone, or nothing. Fear-relevant and neutral pictures are equally often followed by each
of the outcomes. After the series of slides, subjects are asked to estimate the contingencies between
slides and outcomes (e.g., “Given that you saw a spider picture, on what percentage of those
trials was the spider followed by a shock?”). Under these experimental conditions, phobic subjects
systematically overestimate the contingency between phobic stimuli and aversive outcomes
(Tomarken, Sutton, & Mineka, 1995). Interestingly, De Jong, Van den Hout, and Merckelbach
(1995) found that residual covariation bias in treated spider phobics is predictive of relapse. That
is, the stronger the post-treatment overestimation of the contingency between spider pictures and
aversive shock, the higher spider fear levels at 2-years follow-up. Thus, phobics have a tendency
to attribute aversive experiences to the phobic object and this, in turn, will sustain their phobic
fear. It is plausible to assume that covariation biases also occur in fearful and phobic children
(Daleiden & Vasey, 1997).
3.5. Conclusion
Over the past decade, our knowledge of factors that are involved in the etiology of childhood
specific phobias has increased considerably. The framework described above attempts to structure
this knowledge and integrates evidence from various sources. It emphasizes a multifaceted etiol-
ogy of childhood specific phobias and is based on the assumption that there is a continuity between
normal developmental fears and childhood specific phobias. However, whereas childhood fears
are common but transitory phenomena in most children, there is a small subgroup of children in
whom these fears tend to radicalize due to a genetic vulnerability. This genetic vulnerability may
manifest itself in certain behavioural patterns (e.g., behavioural inhibition and disgust sensitivity).
Learning experiences (conditioning, modeling, negative information, and experiences of
uncontrollability) interact with normal developmental fears and genetically based behavioural pat-
terns to produce extremely persistent fears that ultimately take the form of a specific phobia (or
another anxiety disorder; see Craske, 1997). Once a specific phobia exists, it is maintained by
cognitive mechanisms such as attentional bias and covariation bias.
4. Discussion
Our model differs radically from the non-associative account of phobic etiology. The basic
assumption of this account seems to be that discrete learning experiences play a marginal role in
the etiology of certain types of specific phobias. According to the non-associative account, these
phobias reflect innate and spontaneous reactions to evolutionary prepotent cues. From a scientific
point of view, such an explanation is not very satisfactory. After all, science is about causal
associations and so, one would like to know where “spontaneous” fears and phobias originate
from (see also Forsyth & Chorpita, 1997).
In our opinion, etiological models of specific phobias cannot do without the explanatory power
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of learning experiences and concepts like disgust sensitivity and behavioural inhibition. We do
not claim that our model has the merits of a scientific model in the strict sense of the word. Most
importantly, the precise dynamics between the various factors that figure in the model are far
from clear. For example, do learning experiences only contribute to a radicalization of develop-
mental fears during a critical period (e.g., when a certain developmental fear is at its maximum)?
Or is it the case that learning experiences in combination with genetically based behavioural
patterns reinstate developmental fears that disappeared during a previous phase? These issues
require longitudinal prospective studies that include various parameters. However, compared to
the non-associative view, our model better approaches a consensus among researchers about the
complexity of the etiological antecedents involved in specific phobias.
References
American Psychiatric Association (1994). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.). Washington,
DC: American Psychiatric Association.
Bauer, D. H. (1976). An exploratory study of developmental changes in children’s fears. Journal of Child Psychology
and Psychiatry, 17, 69–74.
Bertenthal, B. I., Campos, J. J., & Barrett, K. C. (1984). Self-produced locomotion: An organizer of emotional, cogni-
tive, and social development in infancy. In R. Emde, & R. Harmon, Continuities and discontinuities in development.
New York: Plenum Press.
Biederman, J., Rosenbaum, J. F., Chaloff, J., & Kagan, J. (1995). Behavioral inhibition as a risk factor for anxiety
disorders. In J. S. March, Anxiety disorders in children and adolescents. New York: Guilford Press.
Biederman, J., Rosenbaum, J. F., Hirshfeld, D. R., Faraone, S. V., Bolduc, E. A., Gersten, M., Meminger, S. R., Kagan,
J., Snidman, N., & Reznick, S. (1990). Psychiatric correlates of behavioural inhibition in young children of parents
with and without psychiatric disorders. Archives of General Psychiatry, 47, 21–26.
Biederman, J., Rosenbaum, J. F., Bolduc-Murphy, E. A., Faraone, S. V., Chaloff, J., Hirshfeld, D. R., & Kagan, J.
(1993). A 3-year follow-up of children with and without behavioral inhibition. Journal of the American Academy
of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 32, 814–821.
Chorpita, B. F., & Barlow, D. H. (1998). The development of anxiety: The role of control in the early environment.
Psychological Bulletin, 124, 3–21.
Craske, M. G. (1997). Fear and anxiety in children and adolecents. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 61(2, Suppl. A),
A4–A36.
Dadds, M. R., Barrett, P. M., & Rapee, R. M. (1996). Family process and child anxiety and aggression: An observational
analysis. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 24, 715–734.
Daleiden, E. L., & Vasey, M. W. (1997). An information-processing perspective on childhood anxiety. Clinical Psy-
chology Review, 17, 407–429.
De Jong, P. J., Andrea, H., & Muris, P. (1997). Spider phobia in children: Disgust and fear before and after treatment.
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 35, 559–562.
De Jong, P. J., & Muris, P. (in press). Spider phobia: Interaction of disgust and perceived likelihood of involuntary
physical contact. Journal of Anxiety Disorders.
De Jong, P. J., Van den Hout, M. A., & Merckelbach, H. (1995). Covariation bias and the return of fear. Behaviour
Research and Therapy, 33, 211–213.
Ferrari, M. (1986). Fears and phobias in childhood: Some clinical and developmental considerations. Child Psychiatry
and Human Development, 17, 75–87.
Field, A. P., Argyris, N. G., & Knowles, K. A. (in press). Who’s afraid of the big bad wolf: A prospective paradigm
to test Rachman’s indirect pathways in children. Behaviour Research and Therapy.
Forsyth, J. P., & Chorpita, B. F. (1997). Unearthing the nonassociative origins of fears and phobias: A rejoinder.
Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 28, 297–305.
194 P. Muris et al. / Behaviour Research and Therapy 40 (2002) 185–195
Forsyth, J. P., & Eifert, G. H. (1996). Systemic alarms in fear conditioning I: A reappraisal of what is being conditioned.
Behavior Therapy, 27, 441–462.
Gray, J. A. (1982). The neuropsychology of anxiety. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gray, J. A., & McNaughton, N. (1996). The neuropsychology of anxiety: A reprise. In D. A. Hope, Nebraska symposium
on motivation: Perspectives on anxiety, panic, and fear. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
Gru¨ner, K., Muris, P., & Merckelbach, H. (1999). The relationship between anxious rearing behaviours and anxiety
disorders symptomatology in normal children. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 30, 27–35.
Gullone, E. (2000). The development of normal fear: A century of research. Clinical Psychology Review, 20, 429–451.
Haidt, J., McCauley, C., & Rozin, P. (1994). Individual differences in sensitivity to disgust: A scale sampling seven
domains of disgust elicitors. Personality and Individual Differences, 16, 701–713.
Kagan, J., Kearsley, R. B., & Zelazo, P. R. (1975). The emergence of initial apprehension to unfamiliar peers. In M.
Lewis, & L. A. Rosenblum, Friendship and peer relations. New York: Wiley.
Kagan, J., Reznick, J. S., Clarke, C., Snidman, N., & Garcia-Coll, C. (1984). Behavioral inhibition to the unfamiliar.
Child Development, 55, 2212–2225.
Kashani, J. H., Vaidya, A. F., Soltys, S. M., Dandoy, A. C., Katz, L. M., & Reid, J. C. (1990). Correlates of anxiety
in psychiatrically hospitalized children and their parents. American Journal of Psychiatry, 147, 319–323.
Kendler, K. S., Neale, M. C., Kessler, R. C., Heath, A. C., & Eaves, L. J. (1992). The genetic epidemiology of phobias
in women: The interrelationships of agoraphobia, social phobia, situational phobia, and simple phobia. Archives of
General Psychiatry, 49, 273–281.
Kheriaty, E., Kleinknecht, R. A., & Hyman, I. E. (1999). Recall and validation of phobia origins as a function of a
structured interview versus the Phobia Origins Questionnaire. Behavior Modification, 23, 61–78.
King, N. J., Gullone, E., & Ollendick, T. H. (1998). Etiology of childhood phobias: Current status of Rachman’s three
pathways theory. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 36, 297–309.
King, N. J., Hamilton, D. I., & Ollendick, T. H. (1988). Children’s fears and phobias: A behavioral perspective.
Chichester: Wiley.
King, N. J., Ollendick, T. H., & Murphy, G. C. (1997). Assessment of childhood phobias. Clinical Psychology Review,
17, 667–687.
Malloy, P., & Lewis, D. J. (1988). A laboratory demonstration of persistent human avoidance. Behavior Therapy, 19,
229–241.
Marks, I. M. (1987). Fears, phobias, and rituals. Panic, anxiety, and their disorders. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Martin, M., Horder, P., & Jones, G. V. (1992). Integral bias in naming phobia-related words. Cognition and Emotion,
6, 479–486.
Menzies, R. G., & Clarke, J. C. (1995). The etiology of phobias: A nonassociative account. Clinical Psychology Review,
15, 23–48.
Merckelbach, H., & De Jong, P. J. (1996). Evolutionary models of phobias. In G. C. L. Davey, Phobias: A handbook
of description, treatment, and theory. Chichester: Wiley.
Merckelbach, H., De Jong, P. J., Muris, P., & Van den Hout, M. A. (1996). The etiology of specific phobias: A review.
Clinical Psychology Review, 16, 337–361.
Merckelbach, H., & Muris, P. (1997). The etiology of childhood spider phobia. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 35,
1031–1034.
Merckelbach, H., Muris, P., & Schouten, E. (1996). Pathways to fear in spider phobic children. Behaviour Research
and Therapy, 34, 935–938.
Mowrer, P. (1960). Learning theory and behavior. New York: Wiley.
Muris, P., & Merckelbach, H. (1998). Perceived parental rearing behaviour and anxiety disorders symptoms in normal
children. Personality and Individual Differences, 25, 1199–1206.
Muris, P., & Merckelbach, H. (2001). The etiology of childhood specific phobias: A multifactorial model. In M. W.
Vasey, & M. Dadds, The developmental psychopathology of anxiety. New York: Oxford University Press.
Muris, P., Merckelbach, H., & Collaris, R. (1997). Common childhood fears and their origins. Behaviour Research
and Therapy, 35, 929–937.
Muris, P., Merckelbach, H., Schmidt, H., & Tierney, S. (1999). Disgust sensitivity, trait anxiety, and anxiety disorders
symptoms in normal children. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 37, 953–961.
195P. Muris et al. / Behaviour Research and Therapy 40 (2002) 185–195
Muris, P., Steerneman, P., Merckelbach, H., & Meesters, C. (1996). The role of parental fearfulness and modeling in
children’s fear. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 34, 265–268.
Ollendick, T. H., & King, N. J. (1998). Empirically supported treatments for children with phobic and anxiety disorders:
Current status. Journal of Clinical Child Psychology, 27, 156–167.
Poulton, R., & Menzies, R. G. (2002). Non-associative fear acquisition: A review of the evidence from retrospective
and longitudinal research. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40, 127–149.
Rachman, S. J. (1977). The conditioning theory of fear acquisition: A critical examination. Behaviour Research and
Therapy, 15, 375–387.
Rachman, S. J. (1991). Neoconditioning and the classical theory of fear acquisition. Clinical Psychology Review, 11,
155–173.
Riley, J. C. (1986). Insects and the European mortality decline. American Historical Review, 91, 833–858.
Spence, S. H., & Dadds, M. R. (1996). Preventing childhood anxiety disorders. Behaviour Change, 13, 241–249.
Stevenson, J., Batten, N., & Cherner, M. (1992). Fears and fearfulness in children and adolescents: A genetic analysis
of twin data. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 33, 977–985.
Taylor, S. (1998). The hierarchic structure of fears. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 36, 205–214.
Tomarken, A. J., Sutton, S. K., & Mineka, S. (1995). Fear-relevant illusory correlations: What types of associations
promote judgmental bias? Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 104, 312–326.
Vasey, M. W., Daleiden, E. L., Williams, L. L., & Brown, L. M. (1995). Biased attention in childhood anxiety disorders:
A preliminary study. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 23, 267–279.
Vasey, M. W., El-Hag, N., & Daleiden, E. L. (1996). Anxiety and the processing of emotionally-threatening stimuli:
Distinctive patterns of selective attention among high- and low-test-anxious children. Child Development, 67,
1173–1185.
Watts, F. N., McKenna, F. P., Sharrock, R., & Trezise, L. (1986). Colour naming of phobia-related words. British
Journal of Psychology, 77, 97–108.
